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1. Introduction 
Whistleblowing is a form of internal control 
which aims to establish good governance in 
government owned companies and institutions 
(Semendawai & Santoso, 2011). Through the 
whistleblowing system, various dysfunctional 
behaviors committed by organization members 
can be revealed, for instance corruption, data 
manipulation, cash theft, bribery, nepotism, and 
other unethical actions. The dysfunctional 
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behavior occurring in an organization is usually 
known by co-workers or colleagues, in which they 
have three choices of response: resigning from the 
company or institution, reporting to the authorized 
party, or silent and doing nothing (Mesmer-
Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005). Those choices 
cause a dilemma for the involved individuals 
(Lurie & Albin, 2007).  Although whistleblowing 
is not a frequent phenomenon happens within an 
organization, its effectiveness in Indonesia is still 
widely questionable.  
Several of the most well-known 
whistleblowing cases are done by Cynthia Cooper 
in Worldcom company case, Sheron Watkins in 
Enron company case, and Jeffrey Wigand in 
Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corporation. 
AFCE Ethics Line from America conducted a 
study to 1.843 cheating cases taking place in 106 
countries and figured out that the potential loss 
caused by cheating reached 5% out of the annual 
company income (Semendawai & Santoso, 
2011). The impact may be worse if the actions is 
not reported. 
In Indonesia, there were more than 900 
corruption cases successfully revealed by 
Indonesian Police in 2012 (Semendawai & 
Santoso, 2011) . One of the whistleblower figures 
in Indonesia is Vincentius Amin Sutanto, a 
former employee of PT. Asian Agri, who 
revealed the tax manipulation scandal for as 
much as billions Indonesian Rupiah committed 
by Sukanto Tanoto (Semendawai & Santoso, 
2011).  
The guideline for the Whistleblowing System 
(WBS or Sistem Pelaporan dan Pelanggaran- 
SPP) in Indonesia is published by the National 
Committee of Governance Policy (Komite 
Nasional Kebijakan Governance/ KNKG) on 
November 10, 2008. One of the duties of KNKG 
is issuing the guide of Corporate Governance, 
Compliance and Ethics, Cheating & Corruption, 
and Whistleblower. Besides, Indonesia has the 
Constitution Law No. 13/2006 regarding the 
protection towards witnesses and victims of 
public crime which involves the process of 
protecting witnesses and victims starting from the 
investigation phase until the court decision. There 
is also a circular of the Indonesian Supreme 
Court Number 4/2011 regarding treatment to 
whistleblower and the cooperating witness. 
Although the guidelines and the constitution laws 
exist, still many cases remain unrevealed.  
Whistleblowing system has been 
implemented in both private and public 
companies in Indonesia, such as Telkom,  
Pertamina,  Bank  Negara  Indonesia (BNI), Bank 
Rakyat  Indonesia (BRI),  Astra  Group, 
Directorate General of Taxation, and many other 
institutions. This system is created to facilitate 
the revelation of dysfunctional behaviors or any 
other behaviors violating the constitution 
committed by organization members towards the 
authorized party. However, experts believe that 
procedures in handling cheating cases in 
Indonesia is still need to be improved especially 
in encouraging individuals to become a 
whistleblower. 
Previous research has examined several 
significant factors affecting whistleblowing. 
Among those factors are moral reasoning and 
retaliation Liyanarachchi & Newdick (2009) and  
Taylor & Curtis (2010), demographic 
characteristic (Erkmen et al., 2014; Keenan, 
2007; Schultz et al., (1993), individual factor 
(Chiu, 2003; J. P. Near & Miceli, 1985), personal 
cost (Jos et al., 1989), organization commitment 
(Somers & Casal, 1994), situational factor 
(Kaplan & Schultz, 2007; Somers & Casal., 
2011), error (Schultz et al., 1993), reporting 
channel (Kaplan et al., 2012) and status of the 
violator (Near & Miceli, 1995). Unlike previous 
research, this study examines the organizational 
justice factor, emotional connection, and 
reporting channel which combines organizational 
and individual factors. The variable selection is 
based on the recent condition needed by the 
organization and the individuals inside the 
organization.  
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As an internal control mechanism, the 
whistleblowing system has to be crafted by 
considering organizational factor namely justice 
of organization. Organizational justice is a 
working system giving the justice for all 
organization members. Employees who feel that 
they are treated fairly by their boss tend to frame 
their relationship based on social interaction and 
show behaviors which are beneficial for an 
organization like whistleblowing practice 
(Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001; Moorman, 
1991; Organ, 1988; Podsakoff et al., 2000; 
Vandekerckhove & Commers, 2004). 
Based on a survey towards whistleblowers, 
data show that the most crucial factor in 
motivating whistleblowing intention is the clear 
channel to blow the whistle, a situation which 
supports revelation, and the degree of the 
possibility by the management to improve 
whistleblowing system (Callahan & Dworkin, 
1994; Dworkin, 2007; Marcia Parmerlee Miceli, 
1984). Those factors are structural in nature and 
can be controlled by company management. 
Besides, those factors are consistent with 
procedural, interactional, and distributive justice 
(Seifert et al., 2010).  
Treviño & Weaver (2001) and Seifert et al., 
(2010) investigated the correlation between 
organizational justice and whistleblowing. The 
result showed that individuals receiving fair 
treatment tend to report dysfunctional actions. 
Research focusing in the correlation between 
organizational justice and whistleblowing 
intention is still limited. Therefore, it is necessary 
to re-examine the role of organizational justice to 
increase whistleblowing intention for individuals 
involved in the organization.  
Furthermore, the emotional connection 
between the cheater and the reporter also gives an 
impact on whistleblowing intention. Kolibiki 
(2014) mentions that a relationship can be created 
based on kinship, meeting, new social situations, 
being in a public environment, and other factors. 
Emotional connection signifies the emotional 
connection between individuals. This condition is 
associated by past experiences. The emotional 
connection can be seen from a loyalty construct. 
According to Larmer (1992), loyalty deals with 
the feeling of employees towards their 
colleagues. This feeling becomes a factor that 
makes individuals feel a dilemma whether or not 
to blow the whistle.  
Liyanarachchi & Newdick (2009) tested the 
impact of employees’ loyalty to improve the 
awareness of presenting goodness to 
organizations and colleagues by reporting 
cheating behavior. Besides, research on 
whistleblowing correlated with emotional 
connection framed by loyalty construct is still 
scanty (Corvino, 2015; Coughlan, 2005; Larmer, 
1992; Vandekerckhove & Commers, 2004). 
further examination is needed to figure out the 
impact of emotional connection on 
whistleblowing intention.  
Dworkin & Near (1997) stated that 
whistleblowing resembles an action of a good 
citizen which has to be encouraged and rewarded. 
To act as a whistleblower needs courage. Thus, the 
non-anonymous reporting channel with an 
incentive is imperative in any whistleblowing 
system. Based on the reinforcement theory, 
individuals will commit an action based on the 
reward after the action is completed. Hoque (2003) 
argued that incentive is one of the components to 
formulate a management control system. By 
giving incentives, a non-anonymous reporting 
channel can be effective. This idea goes along 
with Near & Miceli (1995) who do not encourage 
the anonymous reporting channel because this 
path causes the whistleblowing system to lose its 
effectiveness.  
Dworkin & Near (1997); Dworkin (2007); 
and Miceli et al., (2008) state that the anti-
retaliation (anonymous) model is less effective in 
encouraging individuals to blow the whistle. It 
means that an anonymous reporting channel is not 
always effective as a supporting factor in 
whistleblowing. The evidence shows that 
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company can use an incentive to persuade 
individuals to blow the whistle by showing their 
identities so that it eases the authorized party to 
track whistleblowing case through communication 
with the reporter.  
Referring to the above discussion, 
investigations on the role of incentive in affecting 
individuals’ behavior to perform whistleblowing is 
necessary. Research carried out by Ayers & 
Kaplan (2005) and Kaplan et al., (2012) did not 
include an incentive as a variable which 
encouraged employees to blow the whistle on a 
non-anonymous path while research conducted by 
Dworkin (2007); Xu & Ziegenfuss (2008); and 
Dyck et al., (2010)  declared that incentive played 
a positive role in whistleblowing but the 
researchers did not differentiate the reporting 
channels. 
Miceli et al., (2008) believed that a good and 
transparent reporting channel may have an impact 
on motivation to blow the whistle. Therefore, this 
research aims to fill the gap by examining 
organizational factors covering organizational 
justice, three paths of the report (non-anonymous 
with incentive, non-anonymous without incentive, 
and anonymous) towards whistleblowing 
intention, and two levels of emotional connection 
within management accounting context.  
Moreover, prior researches have not examined 
the correlation between organizational justice and 
emotional connection with incentives. Thus, this 
study applies management accounting context in 
examining whistleblowing intention because 
management accountant possesses the 
responsibility to detect cheat Charron & Lowe 
(2008) according to the responsibility of 
management accountant stated on the management 
accountant ethics. The AICPA  and IMA ethics 
require accountants and management accountant 
to be internal whistleblower (Chiasson et al., 
1995). 
This study presents several practical, 
theoretical, and methodological implications. The 
practical implication is accomplished by giving 
the properest whistleblowing mechanism by 
applying organizational justice and incentive. 
Theoretically, the result of this study provides 
support for reinforcement theory and the hierarchy 
of needs theory by Maslow stating that this 
phenomenon can be explained using the theories. 
Methodologically, the use of three whistleblowing 
cases can identify the consistency of participants’ 
answers.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
discusses the concepts of whistleblowing, 
emotional connection, and organizational justice. 
Section 3 describes the research design used in 
this study. Section 4 gives the comprehensive 
results of hypothesis test and discussion of the 
findings. The last section concludes the research 
findings and propose further research 
recommendations, 
 
2. Literature review  
Whistleblowing intention 
The definition of whistleblowing is declared 
by (Near & Miceli, 1985:4) as:  
“the disclosure by organization members 
(former and current) of illegal, immoral, or 
illegitimate practices under the control of 
their employers, to persons or organizations 
that may be able to effect action”.  
The whistleblowing is an act of revealing 
illegal practice in the form of corruption, data 
manipulation, bribery, and other dysfunctional 
acts. These illegal practices will bring loss for the 
organization depending on the level of the acts. 
When figuring out cheating behavior, individual 
intention/behavior can be seen from the action of 
whether or not he or she reports the cheat which 
is called whistleblowing intention. Individuals 
who decide to blow the whistle give benefits for 
the company both material and non-material 
benefits.  
The cheating acts done by organization 
members can be reported to either internal or 
external parties. Individuals who report the 
dysfunctional behavior are called as a 
whistleblower. Semendawai, et al. (2011) define 
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a whistleblower if he fulfills two criteria. The 
first criterion is that whistleblower makes a report 
to the authorized party. Near & Miceli (1985) 
that blowing the whistle to internal authority can 
bring benefits for the company as the issue is not 
spread outside. The second criterion is that the 
whistleblower is an insider. It means that a 
whistleblower is a person who understands the 
organization's activities so that the report is 
reliable.  
Through an effective internal control, a 
company or governmental institution can 
maintain the asset. Therefore, an effective 
whistleblowing system should be implemented to 
facilitate cheat revelation. The whistleblowing 
system explains the report pattern based on three 
provisions explained in reporting channels. 
Indonesia has not yet had a special external 
institution that deals with whistleblowing so that 
it is done in the internal company through the 
role of the internal auditor and other management 
members who are considered to be capable of 
solving whistleblowing problems (Seifert et al., 
2010). 
 
Non-anonymous and incentive reporting 
channel 
Individuals need the motivation to act. Based 
on the reinforcement theory introduced by B. F. 
Skinner in 1977, individuals act according to the 
consequences which follow (Wixted & Gaitan, 
2002). The consequence can be either positive or 
negative. Most individuals are motivated by 
positive reinforcement, where this study uses this 
reinforcement in the form of incentive to increase 
whistleblowing intention (Wei & Yazdanifard, 
2014). Individuals will receive an incentive when 
blowing the whistle. This idea appears since 
individuals need incentives either material or 
non-material.  
Besides, Wei & Yazdanifard (2014) mention 
that basic motivation for individuals to work is 
salary. Hence, one of the ways to make 
whistleblowing systems effective is by giving 
incentives (Dworkin, 2007; Dyck et al., 2010; Xu 
& Ziegenfuss, 2008).An incentive can be 
rewarded only in a non-anonymous reporting 
channel. Non-anonymous reporting channel is a 
mechanism determined as the requirement to 
blow the whistle by including the whistleblower 
identity. With this way, the whistleblowers can 
be identified and rewarded incentives for their 
positive actions.  
Non-anonymous reporting channel with an 
incentive is applied based on previous research 
which states that an anonymous reporting channel 
is a less effective path. Near & Miceli (1995) 
mention that an anonymous reporting channel can 
decrease the effectiveness of whistleblowing. It is 
explained through three reasons.s First, 
whistleblowers or violators not allowed to defend 
themselves or reject the accusation. Second, it is 
difficult for policymakers to see or ask for 
additional information if the whistleblowers do 
not include any pieces of evidence. Third, it 
reduces the credibility of the whistleblowers. 
These become the reasons for non-anonymous 
reporting channel usage.  
Non-anonymous with incentive reporting 
channels encourages whistleblowing intention. 
This idea is explained in the needs hierarchy by 
Maslow (Tikkanen, 2007). In 1943, Maslow 
mentions five individual needs, which are: 
physiological needs, safety needs, love/social 
needs, esteem needs, and self-actualization needs. 
An esteem-need explains the need for confidence 
and feeling enough through reward. The incentive 
is one of the individual needs. Therefore, 
individual incentives can encourage individuals 
to report dysfunctional behaviors by showing 
their identities in the whistleblowing system 
(Putri, 2012). 
Referring to the reinforcement theory which 
states that individuals need positive motivation in 
the form of incentive and is supported by need 
hierarchy model, Maslow declares that 
individuals need a reward, and based on previous 
research stating that anonymous reporting 
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channel is not always effective, the following 
hypothesis is formulated: 
H1: Non-anonymous with incentive reporting 
channel gives a positive impact on 
whistleblowing intention 
 
Organizational justice and non-anonymous 
reporting channel with incentive 
Organizational justice is an organizational 
factor affecting individuals in performing 
whistleblowing and it contributes to the 
effectiveness of the whistleblowing system. Bies 
et al., (1993); Cohen-Charash & Spector (2001) 
& Colquitt et al., (2001) reveal that there is a 
positive correlation between the justice 
dimension and pro-social behavior. 
Organizational justice presents a framework to 
design a structural mechanism needed to improve 
the whistleblowing practice for organization 
members (Seifert et al., 2010). Organizational 
justice consists of three dimensions which are: 
distributive, procedural, and interactional 
(Colquitt et al., 2001). 
There are three crucial factors which can 
improve individual whistleblowing intention 
covering obvious channel to blow the whistle, 
encouraging situation to support revelation, and 
possibility felt by management to fix 
whistleblowing system (Callahan & Dworkin, 
1994; Dworkin, 2007; Near & Miceli, 1985). 
Those factors are structural in nature and can be 
controlled by company management and are also 
consistent with procedural, interactional, and 
distributive justice (Seifert et al., 2010). 
 
Distributive justice 
Distributive justice focuses on the result and 
is the first dimension of organizational justice 
(Adams, 1965). The revelation of cheat will be 
considered as a fair outcome for the 
whistleblowers (Miceli, & Near, 1992). It 
happens because they feel that individuals who 
commit mistakes must be responsible for it. The 
result of an act must be given in a proper 
proportion both for good and bad deeds. Cheat 
revelation completed by an internal division of 
organization will give a positive impact on the 
whistleblowing mechanism as stated on 
distributive justice. This notion is supported by 
Seifert et al., (2010) who mention that 
distributive justice provides a positive effect on 
whistleblowing intention.  
 
Procedural justice  
Procedural justice focuses on process justice 
and is the second dimension of organizational 
justice. Procedural justice shows condition like 
procedure consistency, free of bias in performing 
the procedure, accurate information to make a 
procedural decision, correction on an inaccurate 
procedural decision, the conformity of procedure 
with the existing ethical standards, and 
considering groups’ opinion while performing the 
procedure (Colquitt et al., 2001).   
Individuals think that procedural justice is 
based on fairness during the process of reward 
and punishment decision set by the organization. 
It goes the same with whistleblowing practice. 
Previous research shows that increasing 
whistleblowing requires formal, unbiased, and 
fair whistleblowing policy and procedure (Miceli 
& Near, 1992; Near et al., 1993; Treviño & 
Weaver, 2001). The result of the study completed 
by Seifert et al., (2010) also reveals that 
procedural justice is positively correlated to 
whistleblowing intention.  
 
Interactional justice 
Interactional justice focuses on the quality of 
interpersonal treatment received by employees 
from their boss when the organization procedure 
is implemented (Bies et al., 1993). Interactional 
justice possesses interpersonal component which 
represents how well an individual is treated 
during the procedure performance, result 
decision, information distribution, and 
emphasizing on truth for various decisions which 
have been made as long as the decisions are 
accurate (Scott et al., 2007). Perception of 
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interactional justice is formed from personal 
interaction which frequently takes place between 
managers and their employees (Seifert et al., 
2010). The better the interpersonal relationships 
among individuals are, the higher the 
interactional justice gets. Previous research 
declares that interactional justice can increase 
whistleblowing intention (Miceli & Near, 1992; 
Seifert et al., 2010).  
Miceli & Near (1992) and Near et al., (1993) 
mention that although an organization establishes 
a fair mechanism in whistleblowing system, there 
is still a possibility that formal process in the 
organization does not run as it should. It is 
usually due to the informal interaction and unfair 
treatment between whistleblowers and 
management. In an organization with low justice, 
stimulus in the form of incentives can be 
motivating individuals to blow the whistle. The 
organization has to be able to give reward which 
can encourage individuals to have the intention to 
fix the problems in the organization (M. Miceli & 
Near, 1992). This notion goes along with the 
reinforcement theory and needs hierarchy by 
Maslow. If individuals are put in the highest 
organizational justice, there will not be any 
significant difference between anonymous and 
non-anonymous reporting channels (Kaplan et al., 
2012). A whistleblower is a hero for an 
organization because he can reveal those people 
who commit a cheat and can avoid bigger losses. 
Whistleblowers and the cheater have to receive 
the consequences of what they have done. A 
whistleblower will get a positive reward like 
incentive while the cheater will get a negative 
reward such as punishment. This notion is 
correlated to the concept of distributive and 
procedural justice.  
Based on reinforcement theory which states 
that individuals need positive motivation in the 
form of incentive and supported by need 
hierarchy by Maslow mentioning that individuals 
need a reward, as well previous research 
declaring that organizational justice has to be 
followed by fair treatment for whistleblower and 
cheater, the hypothesis is formulated as follow: 
H2a: Within the context of low organizational 
justice, the use of non-anonymous with 
incentive reporting channels is more 
effective than non-anonymous reporting 
channels without incentive towards 
whistleblowing intention. 
H2b: Within the context of high organizational 
justice, the use of non-anonymous reporting 
channels without incentive is not different 
from an anonymous reporting channel 
towards whistleblowing intention. 
 
Emotional connection and non-anonymous 
reporting channel with incentive 
Emotional connection can cause a dilemma 
for individuals to blow the whistle due to their 
loyal feeling to the cheater. Emotional connection 
is something natural that exist among individuals 
and causes emotional closeness. A connection 
takes place because of kinship, gathering, new 
social encounters, being in the pubic 
environment, and other factors (Kolibiki, 2014). 
No literature specifically explains the emotional 
connection. 
 Therefore, the definition of emotional 
connection is correlated with the term loyalty as 
loyalty signifies a form of emotional connection 
among individuals. (Liyanarachchi & Newdick, 
2009) that employees face a dilemma to choose 
between their loyalty to the organization and their 
social responsibility to do something right. 
Employees’ loyalty is not only aimed at the 
company but also their colleagues (Larmer, 
1992).  
Loyalty is not only about supporting what 
others are doing but also directing people to do 
the right behavior if they commit something 
wrong. It means that the higher the loyalty of the 
employees is, the higher their intention to blow 
the whistle gets (Corvino, 2015; Larmer, 1992) 
and (Vandekerckhove & Commers, 2004). 
However, in practice, individuals still consider 
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employees’ loyalty as behavior that supports the 
action of the organization or individuals inside it 
so that there is not any empirical proof yet 
supporting the statement.  
Emotional connection (loyalty) should be re-
examined by understanding the supporting factors 
to make effective whistleblowing using an 
incentive. Through incentive, an anonymous 
reporting channel can be abandoned since this 
reporting channel creates complexities for the 
authorized party to communicate with the 
whistleblower. 
 If individuals do not undergo a dilemma of 
revelation, there will not be any significant 
difference in applying anonymous and non-
anonymous reporting channels (Kaplan et al., 
2012). Hence, the hypothesis is formulated as 
follow: 
H3a: Within a condition in which individuals have 
a high emotional connection, non-
anonymous with incentive reporting 
channel is more effective compared to non-
anonymous without incentive towards 
whistleblowing intention. 
H3b: Within a condition in which individuals have 
a low emotional connection, non-
anonymous with incentive reporting 
channel is more effective compared to non-
anonymous without incentive towards 
whistleblowing intention. 
 
3. Research method 
Research design and participants 
This research applies experiment design 
3x2x2 between subjects. The researcher chooses 
between-subject design to avoid demand effects 
bias by giving one treatment for each group 
Schepansaki et al., (1992) group receive different 
treatment from others. 
 The independent variable in this study is 
reporting channel, emotional connection, and 
organizational justice. The dependent variable is 
whistleblowing intention. The controlled 
extraneous variable is demographic variable 
through demographic variable examination, 
retaliation variable controlled by arranging anti-
retaliation experiment instrument, and cheater 
status variable controlled by not emphasizing the 
status between cheater and whistleblower in the 
research instrument. Besides, to omit the 
historical bias, the researcher perform 
randomization to the experiment participants.  
This study involved accounting and banking 
students in Yogyakarta, Indonesia. Each group 
consists of at least 10 participants, where a big 
number of participants is better to yield test 
power (Nahartyo, 2013). The reason chosen 
student to be the representative is because the 
assignment given in this experiment needs 
common cognitive ability owned by each instead 
of the special ability which needs individual 
working experience and judgment.  
Besides, involving the student as a 
participant is validated by a research conducted 
by Liyanarachchi & Newdick (2009) mentioning 
that difference in individuals’ profession 
(practitioner and academician) does not generate 
distinct result in understanding material of 
experiment case. It is also supported by Miceli et 
al., (1999) who involves practitioner as a 
participant and shows that the result is not far 
different from a student who acts as a participant. 
Accounting students can be proxy for 
management accountants as long as the examined 
variable does not require any special experience 
and expertise. Students’ properness as a 
participant is tested through a pilot test. 
 
Variable measurement 
Whistleblowing intention 
Whistleblowing intention is an individual’s 
tendency to reveal facts on cheat toward the 
authorized party. The tendency, whether to blow 
the whistle or not, is affected by reporting 
channels, emotional connection, and 
organizational justice. Whistleblowing intention 
is measured using a Likert scale of 7 points (sure 
to not blow the whistle - sure to blow the whistle) 
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based on research by Liyanarachchi & Newdick 
(2009). 
 
Emotional connection 
Emotional connection is an individual’s 
feeling to an object which happens due to the 
individual’s experience. The measurement of 
emotional connection is represented in 
manipulation by describing that individuals have 
emotional closeness with the cheater (family, 
friend, meritorious people, etc) and do not 
possess an emotional connection. 
 
Organizational justice 
Organizational justice emphasizes clarity of 
channels for reporting errors, an atmosphere that 
encourages disclosure, and management 
awareness to improve whistleblowing systems. 
The measurement of organizational justice is 
presented in manipulation describing that 
individuals who are in an organization with high 
organizational justice (distributive, procedural, 
and interactional justice) with low or high ordinal 
scale. Manipulation in organizational justice 
applies the case from (Seifert et al., 2010). 
 
Reporting channel 
Reporting channel is a mechanism 
determined as a requirement to blow the whistle. 
Reporting channel is manipulated in three 
conditions, which are; anonymous channel (blow 
the whistle without showing personal identity), 
non-anonymous without incentive (blow the 
whistle by showing personal identity), and non-
anonymous with an incentive (blow the whistle 
by showing personal identity and getting an 
incentive for the whistleblowing act as a reward). 
The reporting channel is measured by categorical 
scale (anonymous/ no-anonymous/ non-
anonymous with incentive). Manipulation on 
reporting channel is taken from Kaplan et al., 
(2012) and Putri (2012) while the incentive 
model is taken from (Xu & Ziegenfuss, 2008). 
 
Experimental procedures 
The experiment is accomplished in five 
stages. First, participants were randomly formed 
into 12 groups and received different treatment 
through experiment instruments given. Second, 
all participants were requested to read 
information about the general profile of the 
company. Third, each participant was given three 
cheating cases (fake invoices, mysterious bank 
account, dan misclassification) from the variable 
of reporting channel, emotional connection, and 
organizational justice. Fourth, participants 
respond by choosing whether or not to report the 
cheating case which takes place in 7 points Likert 
scale (very unlikely – very likely) on 
whistleblowing intention. Besides, participants 
are also requested to fill in a reporting form to see 
the participant’s behavior. In the last stage, 
participants were asked to answer manipulation 
check questions and demographic questions. The 
experiment is carried out using paper and pencil 
tests; the experiment assignment is adapted from 
(Seifert et al., 2010). 
 
Hypotheses test method  
The hypotheses are tested using the ANOVA 
statistic tool. Gudono (2014) mentions that 
ANOVA is used when researchers intend to test 
the asymmetrical correlation between independent 
variable measured using a nonmetric scale 
(categorical or nominal) and dependent variable 
measured using a metric scale (ratio or interval 
scale). In ANOVA, researchers observe 
differences in the average score on various levels 
(categories) of the independent variable by 
considering variations in each category.  
ANOVA test is completed to see the main 
effect and interaction effect (post hoc analysis) of 
the independent variable on the dependent 
variable. Hypothesis 1 is tested by comparing the 
average score of group 3 and group 1; group 3 and 
group 2; group 6 and group 4; group 6 and group 
5; group 9 and group 7; group 9 and group 8; 
group 12 and group 10; group 12 and group 11. 
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Hypothesis 2a is tested by comparing the average 
score of group 6 and group 5; group 12 and group 
11. Hypothesis 2b is tested by comparing the 
average score of group 2 and group 1; group 8 and 
group 7. Hypothesis 3a is tested by comparing the 
average score of group 3 and group 2; group 6 and 
group 5 while hypothesis 3b is tested by 
comparing the average score of group 8 and group 
7; group 11 and group 10.  
 
4. Results and discussion 
Profile of experiment participants 
Participants in this study are undergraduate 
students of the accounting and banking study 
program who have taken management accounting 
and professional business ethics subjects in one of 
the universities in Yogyakarta. The demographic 
characteristics and the result of the demographic 
variable test on the dependent variable 
(whistleblowing intention) can be seen in the 
following table. 
 
 
 
Table 1. Demographic characteristics 
Data Category Frequency % 
Gender Male  56 32.75% 
 Female 115 67.25% 
Work experience Yes  33 19.30% 
 No 138 80.70% 
 
Table 2. ANOVA’s Test results for demographic, batch, and study program characteristics 
 
Test between subject effect 
Dependent variable: whistleblowing intention  
Source SS Df F Sig 
Control variable 
Gender 0.50 1 0.42 0.52 
Work experience 0.00 1 0.00 0.96 
Batch 6.27 5 1.06 0.39 
Study program 1.18 1 0.99 0.32 
 
Table 2 shows the tests on participants’ 
demographic data and other variables, namely 
batch and study program. Statistic result shows 
that the four variables are not significant which 
fall on the level of significance of 0.05. It means 
that demographic variables, batch, and study 
programs do not affect whistleblowing intention.  
Hypothesis test results 
The data are examined using ANOVA to see 
the difference in the average score of each group. 
The result of the test can be seen in the following 
table. 
 
 
Table 3. ANOVA, means (SD) test results, and groups comparison 
Panel A: test between subject effect 
Dependent variable: whistleblowing intention 
Source SS Df F Sig 
Correction model 86.49 11 10.82 0.00 
Intercept 4819.66 1 6631.05 0.00 
JP 64.52 2 44.39 0.00 
HE 11.73 1 16.14 0.00 
KO 4.20 1 5.77 0.02 
JP*HE 1.45 2 0.99 0.37 
JP*KO 3.46 2 2.38 0.10 
HE*KO 0.02 1 0.03 0.86 
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JP*HE*KO 1.64 2 1.13 0.33 
Error 115.57 159   
Corrected Total 202.06 170   
R squared = 0.428 (Adjusted R squared = 0.388) 
Panel B: Means (SD) and number of participants in each group 
 
High emotional connection status level 
 
                                  Reporting channel 
High emotional connection Anonymous 
Non-anonymous 
without incentive 
Non-anonymous with incentive 
Organizational 
justice 
High x  = 5.26 
(1.02) 
N = 14 
x  = 4.12 
(0.73) 
N = 14 
x  = 4.26 
(1.02) 
N = 14 
Low x  = 5,15 
(0.84) 
N = 15 
x  = 4,36 
(1.02) 
N = 15 
x  = 6,55 
(0.48) 
N = 14 
Low emotional connection level 
                                  Reporting channel 
Low emotional connection  Anonymous 
Non-anonymous 
without incentive 
Non-anonymous with incentive 
Organizational 
justice 
High x  = 5.50 
(0.71) 
N = 14  
x  = 4.55 
(1.04) 
N = 14 
x  = 6.23 
(0.67) 
N = 14 
Low x  = 5.45 
(1.01) 
N = 14 
x  = 5.16 
(0.88) 
N = 15 
x  = 5.55 
(0.48) 
N = 14 
Panel C: Comparison between groups 
Comparison Mean diff. (J-I) SE Sig 
Group 3 – Group 1 0.00 0.32 1.00 
Group 3 – Group 2 1.14 0.32 0.03** 
Group 6 – Group 4 0.99 0.32 0.09 
Group 6 – Group 5 1.79 0.32 0.00** 
Group 9 – Group 7 0.74 0.32 0.49 
Group 9 – Group 8 1.69 0.32 0.00** 
Group 12 – Group 10 1.10 0.32 0.04** 
Group 12 – Group 11 1.39 0.32 0.00** 
Group 2 – Group 1 -1.14 0.32 0.03** 
Group 8 – Group 7 -0.95 0.32 0.13 
Group 11 – Group 10 -0.30 0.32 1.00 
** The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level
The main effect of the variable of reporting 
channel (RC) on whistleblowing intention (WBI) 
is significant with the value of F = 44.39 and 
probability for as much as 0.00 below the 
significant level of 0.05 (Panel A, table 3). 
Reporting channel consists of three levels which 
are: non-anonymous with incentive reporting 
channel, non-anonymous without incentive 
reporting channel, an anonymous reporting 
channel. The means of each reporting channel 
respectively are 5.34; 4.55; and 5.65. The three 
channels commonly have a significant difference 
in the probability of 0.00. 
The main effect of emotional connection (EC) 
on whistleblowing intention (WBI) is significant 
with F value = 16.14 and probability for as much 
as 0.00 (Panel A, Table 3). An emotional 
connection has two levels namely high and low. 
The means of each emotional connection 
respectively are 4.95 and 5.41. The means of the 
two variables generate a significant difference 
with the probability of 0.00. The main effect of 
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organizational justice (OJ) on whistleblowing 
intention (WBI) is significant with an F value of = 
5.77 and probability for as much as 0.02 (Panel A, 
table 3). Organizational justice consists of two 
levels namely high and low. The means of each 
organizational justice respectively are 4.99 and 
5.37. Both means have a significant difference 
with the probability of 0.02. 
Besides the main effect, the impact of 
interaction in 3x2x2 between-subject experiment 
design is tested to see the interactional correlation. 
The test of the test is summarized in table 3 panel 
C. Through the Post Hoc test, below is the 
explanation of the interactional correlation.  
First, the mean difference between group 3 
(RC= non-anonymous with incentive, EC= high, 
OJ= high) and group 1 (RC= anonymous, EC= 
high, OJ= high) is not significant with a 
probability of 1.00. It means that when individuals 
are in a high emotional connection and high 
organizational justice, individuals’ whistleblowing 
intention is the same as the non-anonymous with 
incentive reporting channel and anonymous 
reporting channel.  
Second, the mean difference between group 3 
(RC= non-anonymous with incentive, EC= high, 
OJ= high) and group 2 (JP= non-anonymous with 
incentive, EC= high, OJ= high) is significant with 
a probability of 0.03. It means that when 
individuals are in a high emotional connection and 
high organizational justice, there is a difference in 
individuals’ whistleblowing intention on non-
anonymous with incentive reporting channel and 
on-anonymous without incentive reporting 
channel.  
Third, th mean difference between group 6 
(RC= non-anonymous with incentive, EC= high, 
OJ= low) and group 4 (RC= anonymous, EC= 
high, OJ=low) is not significant with a probability 
of 0,09. It means that when individuals are in a 
high emotional connection and low organizational 
justice. there is no difference in individuals’ 
whistleblowing intention on non-anonymous with 
incentive reporting channels and anonymous 
reporting channels.  
Four, the mean difference between group 6 
(RC= non-anonymous with incentive, EC= high, 
OJ= low) and group 5 (RC= non-anonymous 
without incentive, EC= high, OJ=low) is not 
significant with a probability of 0.00. It means that 
when individuals are in a high emotional 
connection and low organizational justice, there is 
a difference in individuals’ whistleblowing 
intention on non-anonymous with incentive 
reporting channel and non-anonymous without 
incentive reporting channel.  
Five, the mean difference between group 9 
(RC= non-anonymous with incentive EC= low, 
OJ= high) and group 7 (RC= anonymous, EC= 
low, OJ=tinggi) is not significant with a 
probability of 0.49. It means that when individuals 
are in a low emotional connection and high 
organizational justice, there is a difference in 
individuals’ whistleblowing intention on non-
anonymous with incentive reporting channels and 
anonymous reporting channels.  
Six, the mean difference between group 9 
(RC= non-anonymous with incentive, EC= low, 
OJ= high) and group 8 (JP= non-anonymous 
without incentive, EC= low, OJ=high) is 
significant with a probability of 0.00. It means that 
when individuals are in a low emotional 
connection and high organizational justice, there is 
a difference in individuals’ whistleblowing 
intention on non-anonymous with incentive 
reporting channel and non-anonymous without 
incentive reporting channel.  
Seven, the mean difference between group 12 
(RC= non-anonymous with incentive, EC= low, 
OJ= low) and group 10 (RC= anonymous, EC= 
low, OJ=low) is significant with a probability of 
0.04. It means that when individuals are in a low 
emotional connection and low organizational 
justice, there is a difference in individuals’ 
whistleblowing intention on non-anonymous with 
incentive reporting channels and anonymous 
reporting channels.  
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Eight, the mean difference between group 12 
(RC= non-anonymous with incentive, EC= low, 
OJ= low) and group 11 (RC= non-anonymous 
without incentive, EC= low, OJ=low) is 
significant with a probability of 0.00. It means that 
when individuals are in a low emotional 
connection and low organizational justice, there is 
a difference in individuals’ whistleblowing 
intention on non-anonymous with incentive 
reporting channel and non-anonymous without 
incentive reporting channel.  
Nine, the mean difference between group 2 
(RC= non-anonymous with incentive, EC= high, 
OJ= high) and group 1 (RC= anonymous, EC= 
high, OJ=high) is significant with a probability of 
0.03. It means that when individuals are in a high 
emotional connection and high organizational 
justice, there is a difference in individuals’ 
whistleblowing intention on non-anonymous 
without incentive reporting channels and 
anonymous reporting channels.  
Ten, the mean difference between group 8 
(RC= non-anonymous without incentive, EC= 
low, OJ= high) and group 7 (RC= anonymous, 
EC= low, OJ=high) is not significant with a 
probability of 0.13. It means that when individuals 
are in a low emotional connection and high 
organizational justice, there is not any difference 
in individuals’ whistleblowing intention on non-
anonymous without incentive reporting channel - 
anonymous reporting channel.  
Eleven, the mean difference between group 11 
(RC= non-anonymous without incentive, EC= 
low, OJ= low) and group 10 (RC= anonymous, 
EC= low, OJ=low) is not significant with a 
probability of 1.00. It means that when individuals 
are in a low emotional connection and low 
organizational justice, there is not any difference 
in individuals’ whistleblowing intention on non-
anonymous without incentive reporting channel 
and anonymous reporting channel. 
Based on the Post Hoc test on the correlation 
of interaction between groups on point 1, 2, 3, 4, 
5, 6, 7, and 8, it can be concluded that H1 is 
accepted and supported. It means that non-
anonymous with incentive reporting channels 
gives a positive impact on whistleblowing 
intention.  
Although point 1, 2, and 5 are not significant, 
incentive play a role in whistleblowing overall. 
This finding goes along with the reinforcement 
theory. Individuals need reward (incentive) for the 
work or deed they have performed. Hence, 
whistleblowing will be effective by providing an 
incentive (Dworkin, 2007; Xu & Ziegenfuss, 
2015; Dyck et al., 2010). 
Based on the interpretation of the Post Hoc 
test result on between groups' interaction 
correlation on point d and h, it can be concluded 
that H2a is accepted and supported. It means that 
when individuals are in low organizational justice, 
non-anonymous with incentive reporting channel 
is more effective compared to non-anonymous 
without incentive reporting channel on 
whistleblowing intention. It supports research 
conducted by (Miceli & Near, 1992; Seifert et al., 
2010).  
Based on the interpretation of the Post Hoc 
test on interaction correlation between groups on 
point 9 and 10, it can be concluded that H2b is 
accepted and supported. It means that when 
individuals are in high organizational justice, non-
anonymous without incentive reporting channel is 
not different from an anonymous reporting 
channel towards whistleblowing intention. Despite 
the finding that point i is not significant, it can be 
concluded that there is no significant difference 
between the two channels. It supports the research 
finding conducted by (Kaplan et al., 2012). 
Based on the interpretation of the Post Hoc 
test result on interaction correlation between 
groups on point 2 and 4, it can be concluded that 
H3a is accepted and supported. It means that when 
individuals are in high emotional connection, non-
anonymous with incentive reporting channel is 
more effective compared to non-anonymous 
without incentive reporting channel on 
whistleblowing intention. Individuals’ motivation 
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in working is salary Wei & Yazdanifard (2014) so 
that incentive is an attractive matter to people.  
Based on the interpretation of the Post Hoc 
test result on the interaction correlation between 
groups on point 10 and 11, it can be concluded 
that H3b is accepted and supported. It means that 
when individuals are in low emotional connection, 
non-anonymous without incentive reporting 
channel is not different from an anonymous 
reporting channel on whistleblowing intention. 
Individuals do not have any personal consideration 
in performing whistleblowing as there is no 
negative result from the whistleblowing. This 
finding supports the research conducted by 
(Kaplan et al., 2012).  
This study is in line with the research ideas 
from Liyanarachchi & Newdick (2009) who 
mention that emotional connection (loyalty) 
should be tested to see the tendency of individuals 
to blow the whistle. Besides, it supports research 
carried out by Kaplan et al., (2012) about reporting 
channel and confirms research written by workin 
(2007); Xu & Ziegenfuss (2008); Dyck et al., 
(2010); and Putri (2012) who declare that 
incentive plays a positive role in whistleblowing.  
The findings of this study support previous 
research findings, namely the incentive is able to 
encourage individuals’ whistleblowing intention 
(Dworkin, 2007; Dyck et al., 2010; Putri, 2012; 
Xu & Ziegenfuss, 2008). Individuals are attracted 
to money as it serves as the main goal of someone 
who works so that several organizations provide 
an incentive for their employees after they perform 
an action that benefits the company.  
In a more detailed manner, when individuals 
have a high emotional connection, finding shows 
that incentive in non-anonymous reporting channel 
is more effective in boosting whistleblowing 
intention compared to non-anonymous without 
incentive reporting channel. Individuals take a risk 
to blow the whistle with incentive as the reward. 
However, when non-anonymous with an incentive 
is compared to an anonymous reporting channel, 
individuals with high emotional connection tend to 
choose an anonymous reporting path. It might be 
due to the deep feeling connection between the 
whistleblower and the cheater. This idea confirms 
findings by Larmer (1992); Vandekerckhove & 
Commers (2004); and Corvino (2015) which 
mention that emotional connection presents a 
negative impact on whistleblowing intention. 
Although incentive is provided, individuals’ 
whistleblowing intention is still low if they decide 
to blow the whistle on non-anonymous with 
incentive and anonymous reporting channel.  
In the case of individuals with low emotional 
connection in term of comparing the three 
reporting paths, the finding reveals that non-
anonymous with an incentive is more effective at 
increasing whistleblowing intention compared to 
non-anonymous without incentive and anonymous 
reporting channel. While comparing non-
anonymous without incentive and anonymous 
channel, there is no difference in individuals’ 
whistleblowing intentions. This idea signifies that 
individuals do not have emotional consideration 
hence that personal identity is not something to 
worry about. This notion supports research  
Kaplan et al., (2012) about non-anonymous and 
anonymous reporting channels.  
When organizational justice is low, findings 
reveal that non-anonymous with incentive 
reporting channel is more effective to increase 
whistleblowing intention compared to non-
anonymous without incentive channel. Individuals 
perceive that their role in the company is doing 
something good for the company itself. This idea 
supports research carried out by (Miceli & Near, 
1992; Seifert et al., 2010).  
Furthermore, in a high organizational justice, 
comparing the three channels, non-anonymous 
with incentive becomes the option. However, 
when non-anonymous without incentive is 
compared to an anonymous channel, there is no 
significant difference between them on 
whistleblowing intention. This case is 
understandable as individuals feel that the 
company has applied procedural, distributive, and 
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interactional justice. This finding supports 
research carried out by Kaplan et al., (2012) 
(Kaplan et al., 2012) mentioning that when a 
revelation dilemma does not exist, non-
anonymous and anonymous reporting channel 
does not generate a significant difference.  
 
5. Conclusions 
This study investigated factor which 
encourages individuals’ tendency on 
whistleblowing intention, which are: incentive 
through reporting channel, emotional connection, 
and organizational justice. Based on the research 
finding, incentives in non-anonymous reporting 
channels can improve individuals’ tendency to 
blow the whistle.  
This research offers practical, theoretical, and 
methodological implications. Practically, this 
study suggests organizations that the most 
applicable whistleblowing mechanism in 
Indonesia is by implementing organizational 
justice and incentive. Companies must consider 
reporting channel mechanisms and incentives in 
managing the company’s internal control system. 
Besides, with the availability of whistleblower 
identity, it eases the authorized party to track and 
reveal a whistleblowing case by communicating 
with the whistleblower.  
Theoretically, this research contributes to 
literature related to understanding that 
organizational justice can be controlled through an 
incentive model and reporting channel. This 
notion goes along with reinforcement theory 
stating that individuals’ behavior is based on the 
consequence or result of the action. Besides, the 
finding of this study is also in line with the theory 
of needs from Maslow.  
Methodologically, this study facilitates the 
weakness of previous research. First, this research 
applies three cheating cases to see individuals’ 
consistency in blowing the whistle. Second, it 
applies the experiment design to see individuals’ 
intention and behavior in whistleblowing by 
involving independent variable manipulation. 
Third, this study includes management accounting 
context as previous research tends to apply audit 
context while in reality management accountant 
possesses the responsibility to detect cheat.  
This study has several limitations. Firstly, 
most samples are students who were not working 
hence that they tend to still have a high idealism to 
blow the whistle regardless of the condition. 
Secondly, types of cheat in the real professional 
world are more various compared to what 
happened in this experiment which included only 
three cases therefore participants’ answers to blow 
the whistle tend to be consistent. Thirdly, this 
study applies a cash incentive based on the amount 
of loss caused by the cheat.  
Therefore, it can be suggested that adding 
more groups of samples for the future studies. A 
supporting evidence is needed by directly 
involving management accountants as the 
respondents. Moreover, future research can apply 
different types of incentives according to what is 
suggested by Xu & Ziegenfuss (2008) to see what 
type of incentive is more effective in increasing 
whistleblowing intention. Finally, the further 
research should consider individual ethical 
philosophy as different ethical philosophy can 
affect individuals’ decision to blow the whistle. 
 
References 
Adams, J. (1965). Inequity in social Exchange. In 
In L. Berkowitz (Ed.). Advances in 
Experimental Social Psychology (2nd ed.). 
Academic Press. 
Ayers, S., & Kaplan, S. E. (2005). Wrongdoing by 
consultants: An examination of employees’ 
reporting intentions. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 57, 121–137. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/S10551-004-4600-0 
Bies, R., Martin, C., & Brockner, J. (1993). Just 
laid-off, but still a ‘‘goodcitizen?” only if the 
process is fair. Employee Responsibilities and 
Rights Journal, 6, 227–238. 
Callahan, E., & Dworkin, T. (1994). Who blows 
the whistle to the media and why? 
Organizational characteristics of media 
whistleblowers. American Business Law 
66 
Wijayanti & Yandra/Jurnal Dinamika Akuntansi dan Bisnis Vol. 7(1), 2020, pp 51-68 
 
Journal, 32, 151–181. 
Charron, K. F., & Lowe, D. (2008). An 
examination of the influence of surprise on 
judges and jurors’ outcome effects. Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting, 19(7), 1020–
1033. 
Chiasson, Michael, Johnson, G. H., & Byington, J. 
R. (1995). Blowing the wistle: Accountants 
in industry. The CPA Journal, 65(2), 24–27. 
Chiu, R. K. (2003). Ethical judgment and 
whistleblowing intention: Examining the 
moderating role of locus of control. Journal 
of Business Ethics, 43 (1/2), 65–74. 
Cohen-Charash, Y., & Spector, P. (2001). The role 
of justice in organizations: A meta-analysis. 
Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, 86, 278–321. 
Colquitt, J., Wesson, M., Porter, C., Conlon, D., & 
Ng, K. (2001). Justice at the millennium: A 
meta-analytic review of 25 years of 
organizational justice research. Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 86, 425–445. 
Corvino, J. (2015). Loyalty in business ? Journal 
of Business Ethics, 41(1), 179–185. 
Coughlan, R. (2005). Employee loyalty as 
adherence to shared moral values. Journal of 
Managerial Issues, 17(1), 43–57. 
Dworkin, T. M. (2007). SOX and whistleblowing. 
Scientific Research, 105, 1757–1780. 
Dworkin, T., & Near, J. (1997). A better statutory 
approach to whistleblowing. Business Ethics 
Quarterly, 7, 1–16. 
Dyck, A., Morse, A., Zingales, L., & Morse, A. 
(2010). Who blows the whistle on corporate 
fraud? The Journal of Finance, 65(6), 2213–
2253. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-
6261.2010.01614.x 
Erkmen, T., Çalışkan, A. Ö., & Esen, E. (2014). 
An empirical research about whistleblowing 
behavior in accounting context. Journal of 
Accounting & Organizational Change, 10(2), 
229–243. https://doi.org/10.1108/JAOC-03-
2012-0028 
Gudono. (2014). Teori organisasi. BPFE 
Yogyakarta. 
Hoque, Z. (2003). Strategic management 
accounting: Concept, process and issues. 
Prentice Hall. 
Jos, P. H., Tompkins, M. E., & Hays, S. W. 
(1989). In praise of difficult people: A 
portrait of the committed. Public 
Administration Review, 49(6), 552–561. 
Kaplan, S. E., Pany, K., Samuels, J., & Zhang, J. 
(2012). Advances in accounting, 
incorporating advances in international 
accounting an examination of anonymous and 
non-anonymous fraud reporting channels. 
Advances in Accounting, 28(1), 88–90. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adiac.2012.02.008 
Kaplan, S. E., & Schultz, J. J. (2007). Intentions to 
report questionable acts: An examination of 
the influence of anonymous reporting 
channel, internal audit quality, and setting. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 71, 109–124. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-006-0021-6 
Keenan, J. P. (2007). Comparing Chinese and 
American managers on whistleblowing. 
Employee Responsibilities and Rights 
Journal, 19(2), 85–94. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10672-007-9036-0 
Kolibiki, H. M. (2014). A study of emotional 
relationships among deaf adolescents. Social 
and Behavioral Sciences, 114, 399 – 402. 
Larmer, R. A. (1992). Whistleblowing and 
employee loyalty. Journal of Business Ethics, 
11, 125–128. 
Liyanarachchi, G., & Newdick, C. (2009b). The 
impact of moral reasoning and retaliation on 
whistleblowing: New Zealand evidence. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 89, 37–57. 
Lurie, Y., & Albin, R. (2007). Moral dilemmas in 
business ethics: From decision procedures to 
edifying perspectives. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 71, 195–207. 
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s105
51-006-9134-1 
Mesmer-Magnus, J. R., & Viswesvaran, C. (2005). 
Whistleblowing in organizations: An 
examination of correlates of whistleblowing 
intentions, actions, and retaliation. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 62, 277–297. 
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s105
51-005-0849-1 
Miceli, M., & Near, J. (1992). Blowing the 
whistle: The organizational & legal 
implications for companies and employees. 
MacMillan, Inc. 
Miceli, M P, Rehg, M. T., Near, J. P., & C, R. K. 
(1999). Can laws protect whistleblowings? 
Results of a naturally occurring field 
67 
Wijayanti & Yandra/Jurnal Dinamika Akuntansi dan Bisnis Vol. 7(1), 2020, pp 51-68 
 
 
experiment. Work and Occupations, 26(1), 
129–151. 
Miceli, Marcia P, Near, J. P., & Scotter, J. R. Van. 
(2008). Antecedents and outcomes of 
retaliation against whistleblowers: Gender 
differences and power relationships. 
Organization Science, 19(2), 221–240. 
https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.1070.0310 
Miceli, Marcia Parmerlee. (1984). The 
relationships among beliefs, organizational 
position, and whistle-blowing status: A 
discriminant analysis. The Academy of 
Management Journal, 27(4), 687–705. 
Moorman, R. (1991). Relationship between 
organizational justice and organization 
citizenship behaviors: Do fairness 
perceptions influence employee citizenship? 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 76, 845–855. 
Nahartyo, E. (2013). Desain and implementasi 
riset eksperimen (2nd ed.). UPP STIM 
YKPN: Yogyakarta 
Near, J., Dworkin, T., & Miceli, M. (1993). 
Explaining the whistle-blowing process: 
Suggestions from power theory and justice 
theory. Organizational Science, 4, 393–411. 
Near, J. P., & Miceli, M. P. (1985). Organizational 
dissidence: The case of whistle-blowing. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 4(1), 1–16. 
Near, J. P., & Miceli, M. P. (1995). Effective 
whistle-blowing, academy of management. 
The Academy of Management Review, 20(3), 
679–708. 
Organ, D. (1988). Organizational citizenship 
behavior: The good soldier syndrome. 
Lexington Books. 
Podsakoff, P., MacKenzie, S., & Hui, C. (2000). 
Organizational citizenship behaviors: A 
critical review of the theoretical and 
empirical literature and suggestions for future 
research. Journal of Management, 26, 513–
563. 
Putri, C. M. (2012). Pengujian keefektifan model 
whistleblowing: Pendekatan eksperimen. 
Universitas gadjah Mada. 
Schepansaki, A., Tubbs, R. M., & Grimlund, R. A. 
(1992). Issues of concern regarding within 
and between subject designs in behavioral 
accounting research. Business and Economics 
– Accounting, 11, 121. 
Schultz, J. J., Johnson, D. A., Morris, D., & 
Dyrnes, S. (1993). An investigation of the 
reporting of questionable acts in an 
international setting. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 31, 75–103. 
Scott, B., Colquitt, J., & Zapata-Phelan, C. (2007). 
Justice as a dependent variable: Subordinate 
charisma as a predictor of interpersonal and 
informational justice erceptions. Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 92, 1597–1609. 
Seifert, D. L., Sweeney, J. T., Joireman, J., & 
Thornton, J. M. (2010). The influence of 
organizational justice on accountant 
whistleblowing. Accounting, Organizations 
and Society, 35, 707–717. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2010.09.002 
Semendawai, A. H., F. Santoso, W. Wagiman, B. 
I. Omas, Susilaningtias,  dan S. M. W. 
(2011). Mengenal Whistleblowing. Lembaga 
Perlindungan Saksi dan Korban: Jakarta. 
Semendawai, A. H., & Santoso, F. (2011). 
Memahami whistleblower. Lembaga 
Perlindungan Saksi dan Korban. 
Somers, M. J., & Casal., J. C. (2011). Type of 
wrongdoing and whistle-blowing: Further 
evidence that type of wrongdoing affects the 
whistle-blowing process. Public Personnel 
Management, 40(2), 151–163. 
Somers, M. J., & Casal, J. C. (1994). 
Organizational commitment and reporting 
fraud: A test of the reformer and the 
organization man hypothesis. Group & 
Organizational Studies, 19(3), 270–284. 
Taylor, E. Z., & Curtis, M. B. (2010). An 
examination of the layers of workplace 
influences in ethical judgments: 
whistleblowing likelihood and perseverance 
in Public Accounting. Journal of Business 
Ethics Volume, 93, 21–37. 
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs
10551-009-0179-9 
Tikkanen, I. (2007). Maslow’s hierarchy and food 
tourism in Finland: Five cases. British Food 
Journal, 109(9), 721–734. 
Treviño, L., & Weaver, G. (2001). Organizational 
justice and ethics program ‘‘follow-through”: 
Influences on employees’ harmful and 
helpful behavior. Business Ethics Quarterly, 
11, 651–671. 
Vandekerckhove, W., & Commers, M. S. R. 
(2004). Whistleblowing and rational loyalty. 
68 
Wijayanti & Yandra/Jurnal Dinamika Akuntansi dan Bisnis Vol. 7(1), 2020, pp 51-68 
 
Journal of Business Ethics, 53, 225–233. 
Wei, L. T., & Yazdanifard, R. (2014). The impact 
of positive reinforcement on employees’ 
performance in organizations. American 
Journal of Industrial and Business 
Management, 4(1), 9–12. 
Wixted, J. T., & Gaitan, S. C. (2002). Cognitive 
theories as reinforcement history surrogates: 
The case of likelihood ratio models ff human 
recognition memory. Animal Learning & 
Behavior, 30(4), 289–305. 
Xu, Y., & Ziegenfuss, D. E. (2008). Reward 
systems, moral reasoning, and internal 
auditors’ reporting wrongdoing. Journal of 
Business and Psychology, 22(4), 323–331. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/sl0869-008-9072-2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
